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ABSTRACT
This paper tries to reconcile evidence on the effect of schooling on income and on GDP
growth from the microeconometric and empirical macro growth literatures. Much microeconometric
evidence suggests that education is an important causal determinant of income for individuals within
countries as diverse as Sweden and the United States. At a national level, however, recent studies
have found that increases in educational attainment are unrelated to economic growth. This finding
is shown to be a spurious result of the extremely high rate of measurement error in first-differenced
cross-country education data. After accounting for measurement error, the effect of changes in
educational attainment on income growth in cross-country data is at least as great as
microeconometric estimates of the rate of return to years of schooling. We also investigate another
finding of the macro growth literature --thateconomic growth depends positively on the initial stock
of human capital. We find that the effect of the initial level of education on growth is sensitive to
the econometric assumptions that are imposed on the data (e.g., constant-coefficient assumption),
as well as to the other covariates included in the model. Perhaps most importantly, we find that the
initial level of education does not appear to have a significant effect on economic growth among
OECD countries. The conclusion comments on policy implications for Sweden based on the human
capital literature.
Alan B. Krueger Mikael Lindahl
Economics Department Economics Department
Princeton University Stockholm University
Princeton, NJ 08540 S-106 91 Stockholm
and NBER Sweden
akrueger@pucc.princeton.edu Mikael.Lindahl@sofi.su.se[W]hat was rather jarring is the repeatedfinding, in these international data, that
changes in the estimated levels of schoolingor human capital do not contribute
positively to growth, at least measured over the 1965 -85period.
Zvi Griliches, 1997
Research on the economic effects of educationwas marked by two contradictory sets of
fmdings in the 1 990s. On the one hand, the micro laborliterature produced several new
estimates of the monetary return toschooling that exploit natural experiments in which
variability in workers' schooling attainmentwas generated by some exogenous andarguably
random force, such as quirks incompulsory schooling laws or students' proximity toa college.
These studies tended to find that education isan important determinant of income. On the other
hand, the macro growth literature has found thatchanges in average schooling levels across
countries are unrelated to the speed of economicgrowth, although the initial level of schooling is
related to the countries' subsequent GDPgrowth rate. This paper tries to reconcile these two
disparate but obviously related lines of research.
The next section reviews the theoretical andempirical foundations of the Mincerian
human capital earnings function. Oursurvey of the literature indicates that Mincer's (1974)
formulation of the log-linear earnings-educationrelationship fits the data rather well. Each
additional year of schoolingappears to raise earnings by 5 to 15 percent, dependingon the
country, with the United States on the high end and Swedenon the low end of the distribution.
The rate of return to education variesover time as well as across countries. Perhapssurprisingly,
there is little evidence that unobserved variables(e.g., inherent ability) that might be correlated
with earnings and education causesimple OLS estimates of wage equations tosignificantly
overstate the return to education in most countries.Indeed, consistent with Griliches's (1977)
conclusion, much of the modem literature finds that theupward "ability bias" is of about the
same order of magnitude as the downward bias causedby measurement error in educational
3attainment. Evidence on possible differences inthe payoff to investments in human capital
across subgroups of the work force isalso discussed.
Section 2 considers the empirical macro growth literature. First, werelate the Mincerian
wage equation to the macro growthmodel. The Mincer model implies that the change in a
country's average level of schooling shouldbe the key determinant of income growth. The
macro growth literature, by contrast, typically specifiesgrowth as a function of the initial level of
education, not the change in education. Moreover, weshow that if the return to education
changes over time (e.g., because of exogenousskill-biased technological change), the macro
growth models are unidentified. Muchof the empirical growth literature has eschewedthe
Mincer model because studies such as Benhabiband Spiegel (1994) find that the change in
education is not a determinant of economic growth.We show, however, that Benhabib and
Spiegel's finding that the growth in educationis unrelated to economic growth results because
there is virtually no signal in their education dataconditional on the growth of capital.
The macro growth literature has devoted only passingattention to problems caused by
measurement errors (that is, mistakes) in estimated averageeducation. Despite their aggregate
nature, available data on average schoolinglevels across countries are poorly measured, in large
part because they must oftenbe derived from school enrollment flows.The reliability of
country-level education data is no higher thanthe reliability of individual-level education data.
For example, the correlation between Barro andLee's (1991) and Kyriacou's (1991) measure of
average education across 68countries in 1985 is 0.86, and the correlation betweenthe change in
schooling between 1965 and 1985 from these two sourcesis only 0.34. Additional estimates of
the reliability of coimtry-level education databased on our analysis of comparable microdata
from the World Values Survey for 34 countries suggeststhat measurement error is particularly
prevalent for years of secondary and higherschooling. We find that measurement errorsin
education severely attenuate estimates of the effectof the change in schooling on GDP growth.
Nonetheless, we conclude that measurement errorsin schooling are unlikely to cause a spurious
4positive association betweenthe initial level of schooling and GDP growthacross countries,
conditional on the change in education. Thus,like Topel (1998), we conclude thatboth the
change and the initial level ofeducation are positively correlated witheconomic growth.
Finally, we explore the robustnessof the impact of the initial level of schooling on
economic growth. First, we estimate avariable-coefficient model that allows the coefficient on
the stock of education to vary acrosscountries, as is found in the micro data.Second, we relax
the linearity assumption of the initiallevel of education, and explore the effectof controlling for
additional explanatory variables. Third, weestimate growth equations for the subsetof OECD
countries. These extensions show thatthe positive effect of the initial levelof education on
economic growth is sensitive to econometricrestrictions that are often rejected by thedata.
Our main conclusion is that while supportfor the micro Mincerian wage equationis
strong, the evidence of a positiveeffect of the stock of education on a country'sgrowth rate is
less robust. Moreover, if one acceptsthe assumptions necessary to interpretthe coefficient on
the initial level of education in cross-countrygrowth regressions as identifyingexternalities from
education, the results most likely do not applyto the OECD countries.
1. The MicroeconOmicS of the PrivateReturn to Education
The difference between the mostdissimilar characters, between a philosopherand
a common street porter, for example,seems to arise not so much from nature,as
from habit, custom and education.
Adam Smith, 1776
Adam Smith suspected that educationand other environmental factors weremore
important determinants ofeconomic success for individuals thantheir natural ability. Since at
least the beginning of the century,economists and other social scientistshave sought to estimate
the economic rewards individualsreceive from completing moreschooling.1 It has long been
'Early references are Gorseline (1932),Walsh (1935), Miller (955), and Wolfieand Smith (1956).
5recognized that workers who attended school longer may possess inherent abilities that would
lead them to earn higher wages irrespective of their level of education.If these other
characteristics are not accounted for, then simple comparisons ofearnings across individuals
with different levels of schooling would overstate the rate of return to education.Early attempts
to control for this "ability bias" included the analysis of data on siblings and twins to difference-
out unobserved family characteristics (e.g., Gorseline, 1932 and Taubman,1976), and regression
analyses which included as control variables observed characteristics such as IQ andparental
education (e.g., Griliches and Mason). By now this literature has beenamply surveyed in
Griliches (1977), Rosen (1977), Willis (1986), and Card (1998). Belowwe briefly review
evidence on the Mincerian earnings equation, emphasizing recent studies thatuse exogenous
variation in education to estimate the Mincerian earnings equation.
1.1 The Mincerian wage equation
Mincer (1974) showed that if the only cost of attending school an additionalyear is the
opportunity cost of students' time, and if the proportional increase in earnings caused by this
additional schooling is constant over the lifetime, then the log of earnings would belinearly
related to individuals' years of schooling, with the slope equal to the rate of return to investment
in education.2 He augmented this model to include a quadratic term in workexperience to allow
for returns to on-the-job training, yielding the familiar Mincerianwage equation:
(1) lnW1= p0+5+f32X1+ 33X12+,
wherein W is the natural log of the wage for individual i, S. isyears of schooling, X, is
experience (usually measured as age minus education minus 6), X12 is experience squared, and
is a disturbance term. With Mincer's assumptions, the coefficient on schooling, 13,equals the
discount rate, because schooling decisions are made by equating twopresent value earnings
streams: one with a higher levei of schooling and one with a lower level. An attractive feature of
2This insight is also in Becker (1964) and Becker and Chiswick (1966), who specify the cost of investment in
human capital as a fraction of earnings that would have been received if the investment were not made.
6Mincer's model is that time spent in school(as opposed to degrees) is the key determinant of
earnings, so data on years of schooling can be used toestimate a comparable return to education
in countries with very different educationalsystems.
There are, of course, other theoretical modelsthat could yield a log-linearearnings-
schooling relationship. For example, if theunderlying production function between human
capital and earnings is log-linear, and individualsrandomly choose their schooling level (e.g.,
optimization errors), then the coefficient fromequation (1) would uncover the educational
production function. The slope of the earnings-educationgradient would then vary with the
quality of education (see Behrman and Birdsall, 1986 andCard and Krueger, 1996).
The Mincerian earnings function isone of the great success stories of empirical
economics. Equation (1) has been estimated formost countries of the world by OLS, and the
results generally yield estimates ofranging from .05 to .15, with slightly larger estimates for
women than men (see Psacharopoulos, 1995). A coefficientof .05, for example, should be
interpreted as meaning that acquiring an additionalyear of education is associated with 5 percent
higher earnings, other things being equal. Thelog-linear relationship also provides a good fit to
the data, as is illustrated by the plots for theU.S., Sweden, West Germany, and East Germany in
Figure i? These figures display the coefficienton dummy variables indicating eachyear of
schooling, controlling for experience and gender, as wellas the OLS estimate of the Mincerian
return. It is apparent that the semi-log specificationprovides a good description of the data even
in countries with dramatically differenteconomic and educational systems.4 Notice also that in
3The German figures are from Krueger and Pischke(1995). The American and Swedish figures are based on the
authors' calculations using the 1991 March CurrentPopulation Survey and 1991 Swedish Level of Living Survey.
The regressions also include controls for a quadratic inexperience and sex.
4Evaluatirig micro data for states over time in the U.S., Card andKrueger (1992) fmd that the earnings-schooling
relationship is flat until the education level reached by the 2ndpercentile of the education distribution, and then
becomes log-linear. There is also some evidence ofsheep-skin effects around college and high school completion
(e.g., Park, 1994). Although statistical tests often reject the log-linearrelationship for a large sample, the figures
clearly show that the log-linear relationship provides a goodapproximation to the functional form. It should also be
noted that Murphy and Welch (1990) find that aquartic in experience provides a better fit to the data than a
quadratic.
7Sweden the slope of the relationship betweenearnings and education is relatively flat, probably a
result of institutional forces thatcompress wage dispersion in Sweden.
Much research has addressed the question of howto interpret the slope of the education
variable in equation (1). Does it reflect unobservedability and other characteristics that are
correlated with education, or the true reward that the labormarket places on education? Is
education rewarded because it is a signal ofability (Spence, 1973), or does the labor market
value education because it increases productivecapabilities? Is the social return to education
higher or lower than the coefficient on education in the Mincerianwage equation? Would all
individuals reap the same proportionate increase in theirearnings from attending school an extra
year, or does the return to education vary systematically with individualcharacteristics?
Definitive answers to these questions are notavailable, although the weight of the evidence
clearly suggests that education is not merely aproxy for unobserved ability. For example,
Griliches (1977) concludes that instead of finding theexpected positive ability bias in the return
to education, "The implied net bias is either nilor negative" once measurement error in education
is taken into account. The more recent evidence fromnatural experiments also supports this
conclusion.
Table 1 summarizes estimates of the return to education basedon natural experiments. A
hallmark of these studies is that the variations in educationalattainment used to identify the
return to education stem from a known and arguablyexogenous source. For example, Angrist
and Krueger (1991) observe that the combined effect ofschool start age cutoffs and compulsory
schooling laws produces a natural experiment, in which individuals whoare born on different
days of the year start school at differentages, and then reach the compulsory schooling age at
different grade levels. If the date of theyear individuals are born is unrelated to their inherent
abilities, then, in essence, variations in schooling associated with date of birthprovide a natural
experiment for estimating the benefit of obtaining extra schooling inresponse to compulsory
schooling laws.
8Using a sample of nearly one million observationsfrom the U.S. Censuses, Angrist and
Krueger find that men born in the beginning of thecalendar year, who start school ata relatively
older age and can dropout in a lowergrade, tend to obtain less schooling. Thispattern only holds
for those with a high school educationor less, consistent with the view thatcompulsory
schooling is responsible for the pattern. They furtherfind that the pattern of educationby
quarter-of-birth is mirrored by the pattern ofearnings by quarter-of-birth: in particular,
individuals who are born early in theyear tend to earn less, on average.5 Instrumental variables
(IV) estimates that are identified byvariability in schooling associated withquarter-of-birth
suggest that the payoff to education is slightly higher thanthe OLS estimate.6 Angrist and
Krueger conclude that the upward bias in the returnto schooling is about the same order of
magnitude as the downward bias due tomeasurement error in schooling.
The other studies listed in Table 1use a variety of other sources of variability in
schooling. Harmon and Walker (1995), forexample, more directly examine the effect of
compulsory schooling by studying the effect of changes in thecompulsory schooling age in the
United Kingdom, while Card (1995a) exploits variations in schooling attainmentowing to
families' proximity to a college in the U.S. Theevidence summarized in the table is drawn from
several countries, and generallysupports the conclusion that the private return to education isat
least as great as simple OLS estimates wouldsuggest.
The evidence specifically for Sweden ismore limited, but suggests that the private payoff
to education in Sweden is positive but lower than inmost of the rest of the world. For example,
Kjellstrom (1997) uses register earnings data to estimate thepayoff to years of schooling in 1991
for men. Controlling for familybackground, experience, school grades, and testscores at age 12-
5Again, no such pattern holds for college graduates.
Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) argue that Angrist andKrueger's IV estimates are biased toward the OLS estimates
because of weak instruments. However, Staiger and Stock(1997), Donald and Newey (1997), Angrist, Imbens and
Krueger (1998), and Chamberlain and Imbens (1996) show that weakinstruments do not account for the central
conclusion of Angrist and Krueger (1991).
913, he finds that the return to ayear of education varies between .037 and .05 1, dependingon the
birth cohort. Using register dataon earnings for identical twins in 1987,1990, and 1993,
Isacsson (1999) finds that the cross-twin OLSestimate of the return to education is.046, and that
the within-twin estimate is .022. When headjusts the within-twin estimate formeasurement
error in education, however, the return rises to.042, suggesting little downward ability bias.
Similar to the U.S. literature, Ottersten,et al. (1996) find that the return to education inSweden
falls by about 10 percent when they estimatea parametric sample selection model. Meghir and
Palme (1999) find that the return toyears of education stemming from increases incompulsory
schooling is about the same order of magnitudeas the cross-sectional estimate of the return to
schooling in Sweden (see the last row of Table 1).They also find evidence that men with higher
ability tend to earn higher returns to education.Using cross-sections from the Swedish Level of
Living Surveys (LNU), Palme and Wright (1999) find thatthe payoff to education fell for both
men and women from .08 in 1968 to .03-.04 in1981, and stayed roughly constant between 1981
and 1991. Edin and Holmlund(1995) also find that the college-high schoolwage differential
(both before, and especially after, tax) fellconsiderably between 1968 and 1984, and thenrose
gradually rose between 1984 and 1991. Insum, these studies paint a picture of education in
Sweden that is broadly similar to therest of the world: the OLS estimate of thereturn to
education does not appear to beseverely affected by ability bias, although the payoff workers
gain from attaining additional education in Sweden islower than in most other countries that
have been carefully studied.
1.2 Differences in the payoff to humancapital across groups
The studies listed in Table 1 typically findsomewhat higher estimates of the return to
schooling when variability in schooling fromexogenous circumstances is used to estimate the
return than when all variability is used.Although the difference between the OLS and IV
estimates is not statistically significant inmost of these studies, there is at least a hint that
10students who complete more schooling than they wouldordinarily choose earn a higher return for
that schooling than others do from theyears they voluntarily selected. Ashenfelter, Harmon and
Oosterbeek (1998) assemble estimates frommany of the studies in the literature, and find that the
average conventional OLS return to schooling is .065, whereas theaverage IV estimate is .086.
One possible explanation for the tendency of IV estimatesto exceed OLS estimates is that
IV estimates are more likely to be published whenthey obtain statistically significant, positive
coefficients, since there is a presumption that the return toschooling should be positive. Because
the IV studies tend to have relatively impreciseestimates, there may be a selection process at
work which leads to an over-representation of IV studieswith relatively large returns to
education in the literature: a larger coefficient isrequired to have a significant t-ratio the larger
the standard error. Ashenfelter, Harmon and Oosterbeek(1998) provide some evidence for this
type of selection by showing that the return to education from various IV estimatesis positively
related to the standard error of the estimates; absentsome form of selection, there is no reason to
expect the true return to education to be correlated with its standarderror. Once they adjust for
this form of selection bias, however, they still find that thereturn to education is higher in the IV
estimates on average than in the OLS estimates (.080versus .065).
We tentatively conclude from this evidence that thereturn to an additional year of
education obtained for reasons like compulsoryschooling is more likely to be greater than, than
less than, the conventionally estimated return toschooling. Because the schooling levels of
individuals who are from more disadvantagedbackgrounds tend to be those who are most
affected by the interventions examined in Table 1, Card(1995b) and others have concluded that
the return to an additional year of schooling would behigher for individuals from disadvantaged
families than for those from advantaged families.
Other related evidence for the U.S. suggests the payoff to investmentsin education might
be higher for more disadvantaged youth. First, while studies of theeffect of school resources on
student outcomes yield mixed results, there is a tendency to findmore beneficial effects of school
11resources on more disadvantaged students (see, forexample, Summers and Wolfe, 1977,
Krueger, 1998 and Rivkin, Hanushek andKain, 1998). Second, evidencesuggests that pre-
school programs have particularlylarge, long-term effects for disadvantaged childrenin terms of
reducing crime and welfare dependence, and
raising incomes (see, Barnett, 1992). Third, several
studies have found that students from
advantaged and disadvantaged backgrounds make
equivalent gains on standardized tests during the schoolyear, but children from disadvantaged
backgrounds fall behind during the summer whilechildren from advantaged backgroundsmove
ahead (see Entwisle, Alexander, andOlson, 1997). And fourth, recent evidencesuggests that
college students from more disadvantaged families benefitmore from attending elite colleges
than students from advantaged families(see Dale and Krueger, 1998).
Another finding from the U.S. thatmay have some bearing on Sweden concerns adult
education and training. Studies ofjob training programs utilizing randomizeddesign have
typically found modest payoffs for disadvantagedadult males, and larger payoffs for
disadvantaged women (see, e.g., LaLonde, 1995). Evidenceon formal adult education is less
extensive, but also suggests normal rates of returnto adults who return to school afterbeing
displaced. For example, Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan(1997) study the experience of workers
in Pennsylvania and Washington who losta job that they held for three or moreyears, and then
entered a community college. Typically, workerscompleted 8 months to a year of education.
They found that the trainees' earnings increasedby 2-5 percent more than other workers who did
not enter a community college, but thepayoff was substantially higher for those whoprepared
for jobs in certain technical fields and the healthprofessions. Angrist and Newey (1991) also
find that the increase in earningsexperienced by young men who returned to school after
entering the labor market is about as large as conventionalestimates of the payoff to education.
It is unclear whether the evidence ofa higher return to human capital for disadvantaged
youth applies outside the U.S. But in all regions of theworld, Psacharopolous (1995) concludes
7Evidence on training effects for Sweden is consistentwith the U.S. experience; see, for example, Forsiund and
Krueger (1997).
12that there is a higher return toprimary schooling than to secondary ortertiary schooling, which
also suggests disadvantaged children benefitmost from additional human capital investments.
1.3Theoreticalreasons for a higher return for investments indisadvantaged groups
If one tentatively accepts thefinding that the return to investments in humancapital is
higher for less advantaged individuals, whatmight explain such a phenomenon? Card(1995b)
and Lang (1993) present models in whichindividuals from lower income households havehigher
discount rates. Since individuals selecttheir level of schooling byequating the payoff to
schooling to the discount rate, individuals from low-incomehouseholds naturally have higher
returns to schooling in these models.
We would propose a complementaryexplanation, which can also encompass the related
facts about the return to humancapital for disadvantaged groups mentioned above. Inparticular,
recognize that children acquire human capital frommany sources, including parents, teachers and
classmates. To some extent, the humancapital from these sources may be substitutable. Ifan
individual from a high-income family, forexample, receives poor reading instruction at school,
the family may compensate byproviding tutoring. Low-income families have lessscope to
substitute home resources forschooling resources, and have home environments thatare less
conducive to learning, which mightexplain why pre-school programs are successful for these
students. It might also be the case that theeducational production function isconcave, so
students who are at the low end of theability distribution because of their endowments benefit
more from additional human capital than students at thehigh end.
Inherently, both these explanations rely onsome form of imperfect capital markets
because, if families were not constrained,they would invest in human capital until the point at
which the marginal benefit equals the(universal and constant) marginal cost. But thereare
reasons to doubt that the supply of funds for investing in humancapital is infinitely elastic at the
market rate for all families. Many authors havenoted that future human capital caimot be usedto
13collateralize loans because of moral hazard problems.Perhaps more importantly, poorly
endowed families may underestimate the value of education --afterall, education is purchased to
improve information and decision making, and those with a low level of educationmay be
particularly susceptible to making suboptimal decisions.
1.4 Social versus Private Returns to Education
Thus far, the discussion has focused on the private return to education. The social return
can be higher or lower than the private return. The social return can be higher because of
externalities from education, which could occur, for example, if higher education leads to
technological progress that is not captured in the private return to that education, or if more
education produces positive externalities, such as a reduction in crime and welfare participation,
or more informed political decisions. The former is more likely if human capital is expanded at
higher levels of education while the latter is more likely if it is expanded at lower levels of
education. It is also possible that the social return to education is less than the private return.
For example, Spence (1973) and Machlup (1970) note that education could just be a credential,
which does not raise individuals' productivities. It is also possible that in some developing
countries, where higher education has been associated with a greater incidence of unemployment
(e.g., Blaug, Layard and Woodhall, 1969) and the return to physical capital may exceed the
return to human capital (e.g., Harberger, 1965), increased levels of education may reduce total
output.
Most of the micro human capital literature focuses on the private rather than social return
to education, but the finding of little ability bias in the Mincerian wage equation casts doubt on at
least some forms of credentialling arguments. The possibility of externalities to education
motivates much of the macro growth literature, to which we now turn.
2. Macro growth equations
14Now, feducationproduces not only differences in individual capacities but also
new knowledge resulting in continuous technological, managerial andorganizational
improvements, the growth in national product due to these improvementscan
reasonably be regarded as an additional contribution of education.
Fritz Machlup, 1970
If, as Griliches (1977) observed, the micro human capital earnings functionspawned "a
vast river of econometric studies threatening to engulf us all," then it could beargued that the
new macro growth literature has generated a Tsunami ofcross-country regression studies
threatening to wash us all away. The literature is voluminous. We do notattempt an exhaustive
review here.Instead, we summarize the main findings and explore the impact of several
econometric issues.
The macro growth literature yields three principally different conclusionsfrom the micro
literature. First, the initial stock of human capital matters, not thechange in human capital.
Second, secondary and post-secondary education matter more for growth thanprimary education.
Third, female education has an insignificant and sometimes negative effecton economic growth.
2.1 The Mincer Model and the Macro Growth Model
The typical macro growth model estimated in the literature ismotivated by the
convergence literature. This leads to interest in estimating parameters of an underlying model
such as Ay =- + ji, where Ay denotes the annualized change in log GDPper
capita in country jbetweent-1 and t, a denotes country j's steady-state growth rate,y1 is the
log of initial GDP per-capita, y* is steady-state log GDPper capita, and 3 measures the speed of
convergence to steady-state income. The intuition for this equation is straightforward: countries
that are below their steady-state income level shouldgrow quickly, and those that are above it
should grow slowly. A prototypical estimating equation is:
(2) Ay =f30+ f31y + 132SJI + +
15where y is the change in log GDP per capita fromyear t-1 to t, S1 is average years of schooling
in the population in the initial year, Yti is the log of initial GDPper capita, and 4includes
variables such as inflation, capital, or the "rule of law index.'8 Sometimesequation (2) also
includes an interaction between years of schooling and initial log GDP, to allow therate of
convergence to vary across countries with different education levels. Also note that schooling is
sometimes specified in logarithmic units in equation (2). Barro and Sala-i-Martin(1995),
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), and others conclude that the change inschooling has an
insignificant effect if it is included in a GDP growth equation, even though this variable is
predicted to matter in the Mincer model and in some endogenous economic growth models (e.g.,
Lucas, 1988). Equation (2) is typically estimated with data for a cross-section or pooled sample
of countries spanning a 5, 10, or 20 year period.
The Mincer model in equation (1) can be aggregated to thecountry level, yielding what
Heckman and Klenow (1997) call the "macro Mincer model." The dependent variable of the
macro Mincer model is the log of the geometric mean of earnings, and the key explanatory
variable is mean years of schooling (taken over all levels) for the workforce. If thisequation
holds in year t and t- 1, differences over time can be taken for eachcountry, and the countries can
be pooled together. The first-differenced macro-Mincer equation differs from themacro growth
equation typically estimated in the literature in several respects. First, the macro growth models
use the change in log GDP per capita as the dependent variable, rather than the change in the
mean of log earnings. If income has a log normal distribution with a constant variance over time,
and if labor's share is also constant, then aggregating GDP in thisway would not matter.9
Second, and probably more importantly, the macro growth literature typically omits the change
in schooling. Third, because the macro models are motivated by issues ofconvergence they
8Henceforth we use the terms GDP per capita and GDP interchangeably.
9Heckman and Klenow (1997) also point out that half the variance of log income will be added to the GDP equation
if income is log normal. See Heckman and Klenow (1997) for cross-sectional evidence.
16include the initial level of GDP, capital, and correlates forsteady-state income. Indeed, a
primary motivation for including human capital variables at all in theseequations is to control for
y*.
There are at least six ways to interpret the coefficienton the initial level of schooling in
equation (2).b0 First, schooling may be a proxy for steady-state income. Countrieswith higher
levels of schooling conditional on their initial GDP would beexpected to have higher steady-
state income (perhaps because physical capital is easier to obtain than humancapital), so we
would expect countries with higheraverage education levels to grow more (132>0).Ifthis were
the case, more schooling would not change the steady-stategrowth rate, although it would raise
steady-state income. Second, schooling could change the steady-stategrowth rate by enabling
the work force to develop, implement and adopt newtechnologies (see Nelson and Phelps, 1966
Welch, 1970 and Romer, 1990), again leading to the prediction 132>0. Third, countrieswith low
initial stocks of human capital could havegreater opportunities to grow by implementing
technology developed abroad. In this case, one would expect 132<0. Fourth,a positive (or
negative) coefficient on initial schooling may simply reflect anexogenous, worldwide increase
(or decrease) in the return to schooling (see Krueger and Lindahl, 1998); in thiscase, countries
with a high initial level of schooling will naturallygrow faster (slower). Fifth, anticipated
increases in future economic growth could cause schooling to rise(i.e., reverse causality), as
argued by Bils and Klenow (1998). Sixth, the schooling variablemay "pick up" the effect of the
change in education, which is omitted from the equation. Sorting through theseexplanations is
difficult. Indeed, Topel (1998) argues that "little can be learned" frommacro growth equations
because either a positive or negative coefficient on initial humancapital is "consistent with the
idea that human capital is a boon to growth and development."
'°The first three of these interpretations are adapted from Topel (1998). Barro(thisvolume) emphasizes the first twoexplanations.
172.2 Basic Results and Effect of Measurement Error
Table 2 replicates and extends the "growthaccounting" and "endogenous growth"
regressions in Benhabib and Spiegel's influential paper." Theiranalysis is based on Kyriacou's
(1991) measure of average years of schooling for the work force in 1965 and1985, Summers and
Heston's GDP and labor force data, and a measure ofphysical capital derived from investment
flows. Following Benhabib and Spiegel, theregression in column (1) relates the aimualized
growth rate of GDP to the log change in years of schooling. From thismodel, Benhabib and
Spiegel conclude, "Our findings shed some doubt on the traditional rolegiven to human capital
in the development process as aseparate factor of production." Instead, they conclude that the
stock of schooling matters for growth (see column 2 and5) by enabling countries to adopt and
innovate technology faster.
Topel argues that Benhabib and Spiegel's finding of an insignificant andwrong-signed
effect of schooling changes on GDP growth is due to theirlog specification of education. The
log-log specification follows if one assumes that schooling entersan aggregate Cobb-Douglas
production function linearly. Given the success of the Mincer model,however, we would agree
it is more natural to specify human capital asan exponential function of schooling in a Cobb-
Douglas production function, so the change inyears of schooling would enter the growth
equation linearly. In any event, the logarithmic specification ofschooling does not fully explain
the perverse effect of educational improvementson growth in Benhabib and Spiegel's analysis.'2
Results of estimating a linear education specification in column 4still show a statistically
insignificant (though positive) effect of the linear change in schoolingon economic growth.
"We were not able to exactly replicate Benhabib andSpiegel's results because we use a revised version of Summers
and Heston's GDP data. Nonetheless, our estimates arevery close to theirs. For example, Benhabib and Spiegel
report coefficients of -.059 for the change in log education and .545 for the change in log capital whenthey estimate
the model in column 1 of Table 1; our estimates are -.072 and .523. Some of the othercoefficients differ because of
scaling; for comparability with later results, we divided the dependent variable and variables measured inchanges by 20.
'2The log specification is part of the explanation, however, because if the modelin column (3) is estimated without
the initial level of schooling, the change in log schooling has a negative andstatistically significant effect, whereas
the change in the level of schooling has a positive and statistically significant effect if it isincluded as a regressor in
this model instead.
18Columns 3 and 6 show that controlling forcapital is key to Benhabib and Spiegel's
finding of an insignificant effect of the change in schooling variable.When physical capital is
excluded from the growth equation, the change inschooling has a statistically significant and
positive effect in either the linear or log schooling specification.Why does controlling for
capital have such a large effect on education? As shownbelow, it appears that the insignificant
effect of the change in education is a result of theextraordinarily low signal in the education
change variable. Indeed, conditional on the other variables that Benhabiband Spiegel hold
constant (especially capital), the change in schoolingconveys virtually no signal. If the observed
changes in schooling in these data consist purely of random mistakes dueto imprecise measures
of education, then one would notexpect countries who mistakenly appear to have increased their
schooling levels to grow any faster as a result of the increased measuredschooling.
Notice also that the coefficient on capital is high in Table2, around .50witha t-ratio
close to 10. In a competitive, Cobb-Douglaseconomy, the coefficient on capital growth in a
GDP growth regression should equal capital's share ofnational income. Gollin (1998) estimates
that labor's share ranges from .65to.80 in most countries, after allocating labor'sportion of self-
employment and proprietors' income. Consequently, capital's share isprobably no higher than
.20 to .35.Sincemeasured capital is derived from investment flows, and GDP isa direct
function of investment, errors in the investment data willmechanically bias the coefficient on the
growth in capital upwards; this might explain why capital has sucha large and significant
coefficient in the growth equations. If the coefficienton capital growth in column (5)ofTable 2
is constrained to equal .20 or .35-- aplausible range for capital's share --thecoefficient on the
schooling change rises to .09 or .06, and becomes statistically significant.
2.2.1 The Extent of Measurement Error in International EducationData
Random measurement errors in the education data have thesame impact on regression
estimates as static does on radio reception —theymake it harder to detect the message that is
19being transmitted in the data. Measurement error in the educationdata used for cross-country
regressions arises because years of schooling are an imperfectmeasure of human capital, and
because available cross-country data onaverage years of schooling are measured with error. We
focus on the latter problem, although the formermay also be significant. Benhabib and Spiegel's
measure of average years of schooling for the work forcewas derived by Kyriacou (1991) as
follows. First, survey-based estimates ofaverage years of schooling for 42 countries in the mid
1 970s were regressed on the countries'primary, secondary and tertiary school enrollment rates.
Coefficient estimates from this modelwere then used to predict years of schooling from
enrollment rates for countries in otheryears. This method is likely to generate substantial noise
since the fitted regressionmay not hold for all countries arid time periods, and enrollment rates
are frequently mismeasured. Changes in education derived fromthis measure are likely to be
particularly noisy. Benhabib and Spiegel use Kyriacou's education datafor 1965, as well as the
change between 1965 and 1985.
The widely-used Barro and Lee (1993) data set isan alternative source of education data.
For 40 percent of country-year cells, Barro and Leemeasure average years of schooling by
survey and census-based estimates reported by UNESCO. Theremaining observations were
derived from historical enrollment flow datausing a "perpetual inventory method." The Barro-
Lee measure is undoubtedly an advanceover existing international measures of educational
attainment, but errors in measurement are inevitable because theUNESCO enrollment rates are
of doubtful quality inmany countries (see Behrman and Rosensweig, 1994). Additionally,
students educated abroad are miscounted in the flowdata, which is probably a larger problem for
higher education. More fundamentally, secondary andtertiary schooling is defined differently
across countries, so the data for secondary and higherschooling are likely to be noisier than
overall schooling. Notice also that becauseerrors cumulate over time in Barro and Lee's stock-
flow calculations, the errors in education will bepositively correlated over time.
20Even developed countries' data are sometimes measured with error in the available data
sets. For example, as illustrated in Figure 2, the Barro-Lee data set indicates that average
educational attainment declined by 0.2 years in Sweden between 1980 and 1990. This finding
conflicts with other Swedish data, which show rising educational attainment and enrollment in
this period. Between 1980 and 1990, for example, the Swedish Level of Living Survey (LNU)
indicates that the average number of years of education for those age 18 to 75 increased by just
over one year. The different education trends (as well as different mean education levels)
displayed in Figure 2 may reflect the fact that 8.7 percent of Swedes reported completing a major
part of their education abroad according to the 1991 LNU survey, as well as the recent emphasis
on increasing the educational attainment of adults in Sweden.
We can estimate the reliability of the Barro-Lee and Kyriacou data if we treat the two
variables as independent estimates of educational attainment. The so called "reliability ratio"
gives an estimate of the "attenuation bias" in the estimated education coefficient from a bivariate
regression (see Griliches, 1986, and Angrist and Krueger, 1999). The education data are likely to
be much less reliable when they are expressed in changes rather than in levels because much
more of the signal than noise in the data is likely to cancel out when differences are taken. Table
3 presents estimates of the reliability ratio of the Kyriacou and Barro-Lee education data. The
reliability ratios were derived by regressing one measure of years of schooling on theother.13
The cross-sectional data have considerable signal, with the reliability ratio ranging from .77 to
.85 in the Barro-Lee data, and exceeding .96 in the Kyriacou data. The reliability ratios fall by
10 to 30 percent if we condition on the log of 1965 GDP per capita, which is a common
covariate. More disconcerting, when the data are measured in changes over the 20 year period,
the reliability ratio for the data used by Benhabib and Spiegel falls to less than 20 percent, and
'3Barro and Lee (1993) compare their education measure with alternative series by reporting correlation
coefficients. For example, they report a correlation of .89 with Kyriacous education data and .93 with
Psacharopolous's. Our cross-sectional correlations are not very different. They do not report correlationsfor
changes in education.
21to 58 percent in the Barro and Lee data. By way of comparison, note that Ashenfelter and
Krueger (1994) find that the reliability of self-reported years of education is .90 in micro data on
workers, and that the reliability of self-reported differences in education between identical twins
is .57.
These results suggest that if there were no other controls, the estimated effect of
schooling changes in Benhabib and Spiegel's results would be biased downward by 80 percent.
But the bias is likely to be even greater because their regressions include additional explanatory
variables that "soak up" some of the true changes in schooling. Indeed, we estimate that none of
the observed changes in education represent true changes in education once capital growth is
held constant. Instead of rejecting the traditional Mincerian role of education on growth, a more
plausible interpretation is that Benhabib and Spiegel's results shed no light on the role of
education changes on growth because the data contain no signal.
The Barro and Lee data convey more signal than Kyriacous data when expressed in
changes. Indeed, nearly 60 percent of the variability in observed changes in years of education in
the Barro-Lee data represent true changes. This makes the Barro-Lee data preferable to use to
estimate the effect of educational improvements. Despite the greater reliability of the Barro-Lee
data, there is still little signal left over in these data conditional on the other variables in the
models in Table 2. Conditional on capital growth, population growth, and initial schooling and
GDP, only about 40 percent of the remaining variability in schooling changes in the Barro-Lee
data is due to true signal.
Using data on average education for 34 countries from the World Values Survey (WYS),
in Krueger and Lindahl (1998) we find that all years of education in the Barro-Lee data are
measured more accurately than secondary and higher education. Since countries use different
definitions of secondary schooling in the UNESCO data, this finding is not surprising. But it
does suggest that more accurate results will be obtained if all years of schooling are used to
measure human capital.
222.3 Additional Growth Models
Measurement errors aside, one could question whether physical capital should be
included in a GDP growth equation because it is potentially an endogenous variable. Fast
growing countries have more access to investment (see Blomström, Lipsey and Zejan, 1993).
Additionally, considerations of the low signal in schooling changes conditional on capital
growth, and the mechanical correlation between measured capital and GDP (since capital is
typically derived from investment), lead us to prefer parsimonious models that omit capital.
Barro (1997) also excludes capital, so there is some precedent for a parsimonious specification in
the growth literature. We first report models without controlling for capital, and then focus on
the effect of capital in long-difference models in Section 2.5.Wereturn to the effect of
controlling for additional explanatory variables in Section 3.2.
Table 4 reports "stylized" macro growth models without controlling for physical capital
for samples spanning 5, 10 or 20 year periods. The dependent variable is the annualized change
in the log of real GDP per capita per year based on Summers and Heston's (1991) Penn World
Tables, Mark 5:6.Resultsare generally similar if GDP per worker is used instead. We use GDP
per capita because it reflects labor force participation decisions and because it has beenthe focus
of much of the previous literature. The schooling variable is Barro and Le&s measure of average
years of schooling for the population age 25 and older. When the change in average schoolingis
included as a regressor in these models, we divide it by the number of years in the time span so
the coefficients are comparable across columns, and comparable to Table 2. The equations were
estimated by OLS, but the standard errors reported in the table allow for a country-specific
component in the error term. We initially exclude other variables (such as the fertility rateand
rule of law index) that are sometimes included in macro growth models to focus on education,
and because those other variables are probably influenced themselves by education. Perhaps
more importantly, measurement error problems are exacerbated by including covariates. For
23example, the correlation between the log fertility rate and education is -.85inthe Barro-Lee data
set, which implies that the relative signal of average schooling falls to only one third if fertility is
held constant.'4
Our findings parallel Topel's. The change in schooling has little effect on GDP growth
when the growth equation is estimated with high frequency changes (i.e., 5years).However,
increases in average years of schooling have a positive and statistically significant effect on
economic growth over periods of 10 or 20 years. As discussed below, the magnitude of the
coefficient estimates on both the change and initial level of schooling are large, probably too
large to represent the causal effects of schooling.
The finding that the time span matters so much for the change in education also suggests
that measurement error in schooling plays a major role in these estimates. Over short time
periods, there is little change in a nation's true schooling level, so the transitory component of
measurement error in schooling would be large relative to variability in the true change. Over
longer periods, true education levels are more likely to change, increasing the signal relative to
the noise in measured changes.
Measurement error bias appears to be greater over the 5 and 10 year horizons, but it is
still substantial over 20 years. Since the change in schooling and initial level of GDP are
essentially uncorrelated, the coefficient on the 20-year change in schooling in column 8 is biased
downward by a factor of 1 which is around 40 percent according to Table 3. Thus, adjusting
for measurement error would lead the coefficient on the change in education to increase from .18
to .30 =.18/(l-.4).This is an enormous return to investment in schooling, equal to three or four
times the private return to schooling estimated within most countries. Moreover, even if labor
only captures two-thirds of the rise in GDP associated with an increase in human capital, as is
sometimes assumed, the net payoff to labor based on this coefficient is at least double the
conventional return to schooling.
'Wearrive at this estimate by assuming that R5 is .81 in the Barro-Lee cross-country schooling data. Using the
formula in footnote 15, conditional on the log fertility rate the reliability of schooling is (.8l.852 )I(1.852)= .32.
24Like Benhabib and Spiegel, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) conclude that
contemporaneous changes in schooling do not contribute to economic growth, although they note
that measurement error in schooling could bias their results. There are four reasons to suspect
that measurement error has a particularly acute effect on their estimates. First, Barro and Sala-i-
Martin analyze a mixed sample that combines changes over both 5-year (1985-90) and 10-year
(1965-75 and 1975-85) periods; examining changes over such short periods tends to exacerbate
the downward bias due to measurement errors. Second, they examine changes in average years
of secondary and higher schooling. As was shown in Table 3, the reliability of secondary and
higher schooling is lower than the reliability of all years of schooling, and the changes are likely
to be less reliable as well. Third, they include separate variables for changes in male and female
years of secondary and higher schooling. These twovariables are highly correlated (r.85),
which would exacerbate measurement error problems if the signal in the variables is more highly
correlated than the noise. If average years of secondary and higher schooling for men and
women combined, or years of secondary and higher schooling for either men or women,is used
instead of all years of schooling in the 10-year change model in column 6 of Table 4, the change
in education has a sizable, statistically significant effect. Fourth, they estimate a restricted
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) system, which exacerbates measurement error bias
because asymptotically this estimator is equivalent to a weighted average of an OLS and fixed-
effects estimator, and it is well known that a fixed-effects estimator exacerbates measurement
error bias.
Because Barro (1997) stresses male, secondary and higher education as a key determinant
of growth, we have also explored the sensitivity of our results to using different measures of
education, namely primary versus higher education, and male versus female education.We have
a preference for measuring schooling by the average of all years of education, however,because
this is the variable specified by the Mincer model, and because primary schooling is a pre-
25requisite for secondary and higher schooling.'5 Focusing only on secondary and higher education
is analogous to measuring office capital by only counting the number of stories of buildings
above the tenth floor. In any event, when we test for different effects of years of primary and
secondary and higher schooling in the model in column 6 of Table 4, we cannot reject that all
years of schooling have the same effect on GDP growth (p-value equals.40 for initial levels and
.12 for changes). We also find insignificant differences between primary and secondary
schooling if we just use male schooling. We do find significant differences if we further
disaggregate schooling levels by gender, however. The initial level of primary schoolinghas a
positive effect for women and a negative effect for men, the initial level of secondaryschool has
a negative effect for women and a positive effect for men, the change in primary schoolinghas a
positive effect for women and a negative effect for men, and the change in secondary schooling
has a negative effect for women and a positive effect for men. Because schooling levels are
highly correlated for men and women, one needs to be cautious interpreting regressionsthat
include disaggregated education variables.
Barro (this volume) offers an intriguing explanation for his estimated negative effect of
female education on growth: because of gender discrimination, female labor may not be
efficiently utilized in the labor market in many countries. In the extreme, women maybe
educated but discouraged from joining the labor force, so their human capital does not directly
contribute economic output. To test this hypothesis, we used data from the ILO on labor force
participation by gender, and included interactions between gender-specific schoolingand gender-
specific labor force participation rates in the specification in column 5 ofTable 4, as well as main
effects of the variables.16 These results yielded partial support for the discrimination hypothesis.
The interaction between female labor force participation and schooling is positiveand
'Themacro Mincer model would suggest that average years education of all workers isthe appropriate explanatory
variable. Because the Barro-Lee data set does not contain schooling just for workers, we use average schoolingfor
the population age 25andolder.
16Thelabor force data are from "Economically Active Population 1950-2010," Bureau of Labor Statistics,
International Labour Office, Geneva, 1997.
26statistically significant, suggesting that there is less of a negative effect of femaleeducation on
growth in countries that have relatively more women in the labor force.But, even for a country
with a 100 % female labor force participation rate, female educationis predicted to have a very
small, positive effect on growth that is virtually indistinguishable fromno effect.
2.4 Effect of Measurement Error on Initial Level of Education
The positive effect of the initial level of educationon growth is often interpreted as
evidence of large externalities from the stock of a nation's humancapital on economic growth.
Topel (1998), however, argues that "the magnitude of the effect of educationon growth is vastly
too large to be interpreted as a causal force." Indeed, Topel calculates that thepresent value of a
one percentage point faster growth rate from an additionalyear of schooling would be about four
times the cost, with a 5 percent real discount rate. He concludes thatexternalities from schooling
may exist, but they are unlikely to be so large.
One possibility is that the level of schooling isspuriously reflecting the effect of the
change in schooling on growth, which could account for its large impacton growth. Countries
with higher initial levels of schooling also tended to havelarger increases in schooling over the
next 10 or 20 years in Barro and Lee's data, which is remarkable given thatmeasurement error in
schooling induces a negative covariance between the change and initial level ofschooling. We
initially suspected that the initial level of schooling spuriously picksup the effect of schooling
increases, either because schooling changes are excluded from the growthequation or because
the included variable is noisy. In Krueger and Lindahl (1998; section2.4), however, we show
that this is most unlikely. In particular, we show that if education is measuredequally reliably
each period, and if first and second period education are included in thegrowth regression, then
the sum of the two coefficients on the education variables will be biased towardzero. Since a
test of whether the initial level of education influences economic growth conditionalon the
change in education turns on whether the sum of the coefficients on current and lagged education
27is positive, measurement error in education would tend to produce a bias against finding thatthe
initial level of education influences growth.
2.5 Controlling for Physical Capital
The level and growth rate of capital are natural control variables to include in the GDP
growth regressions. First, initial log GDP can be substituted for capitalin a Solow growth model
only if capital's share is constant over time and across countries (e.g., a Cobb-Douglas production
function). Second, and more importantly for our purposes, capital-skill complementaritywould
imply that some of the increased output attributed to highereducation in Table 4 should be
attributed to increased capital (see, e.g., Goldin and Katz, 1997). As mentioned earlier, however,
systematic correlation between measurement errors in capital and GDP, aswell as endogeneity of
capital, are reasons to be wary about including the growth of capitalin a GDP equation.
Nonetheless, here we examine the robustness of our results to controlling for physical capital.
Column (1) of Table 5reportsan estimate of the same 20-year growth model as in
column 9 of Table 4, augmented to include the growth of capital per worker. We useKlenow
and Rodriguez-Clare's (1997) capital data because they appear to have more signalthan
Benhabib and Spiegel's capital data.'7 The coefficient on the change in education falls by more
than 50 percent when capital growth is included, although it remains barely statistically
significant at the .10 level. In colunm (2) we add the initial log capital per worker,and in column
(3) exclude the initial log GDP from the column (2) specification. Includinginitial log capital
drives the coefficient on the change in schooling to close to zero. Notice alsothat the log of
initial capital per worker has little effect in column (3).18Thegrowth of capital per worker has
'7A regression of Benhabib and Spiegel's change in log capital on the corresponding variablefrom Klenow and
Rodriguez-Clare yields a regression coefficient (and standard error) of .95 (.065).The reverse regression yields a
coefficient of .69 (.05). These estimates could be biased toward one because of correlated measurement errorsin
the two variables, since both depend on investment.
'81f the change in log capital per work is dropped from the model in column (3), then initial log capital perworker
does have a statistically significant, negative effect, and the schooling coefficients aresimilar to those in column 9
of Table 4.
28an enormous effect on GDP growth, greatly exceeding capital's share in most countries.This
finding is consistent with the errors in capital being systematically related to GDP, since both are
functions of investment. To explore the sensitivity of the results, in column (4) we constrain the
coefficient on the growth in capital to equal 0.35, which is on the high end of the distribution of
non-labor's share around the world. These results indicate that both the change and initial level
of schooling are associated with economic growth. Moreover, as Heckman and Kienow (1997)
find in cross-sectional data, the coefficient on the change in education is similar to
microeconometric estimates.
As mentioned earlier, including capital could exacerbate the measurement error in
schooling. Indeed, we find that the reliability of Barro-Lee's 20-year change in schooling data
falls from .58 to .46 once we condition on the change in capital, suggesting that the coefficient on
the change in schooling in Table 5 should be roughly doubled. In column (5), to try to overcome
measurement error we estimate the growth equation by instrumental variables, using Kyriacou's
schooling data as excluded instruments for the change and level of schooling. This is the same
estimation strategy previously used by Pritchett (1998), but we employ different schooling data
as instruments, and use a different measure of capital. Unfortunately, because thereis so little
signal in education conditional on capital, the IV results yield a huge standard error (.167)for the
effect of the change in education. Pritchett similarly finds a large standard errors from his IV
estimates, although his point estimates are negative.'9 One final point on these estimates is that,
to be comparable to the Mincerian return to schooling, the coefficient on the change in education
should be scaled up by a factor equal to one over labor's share if the aggregate production
function is Cobb-Douglas and human capital is an exponential function of schooling.20 This
would raise the cross-country estimate of the benefit of schooling increases even further.
'9Aside from the different data sources, the difference between our IV results and Pritchett's appears to result from
his use of log schooling changes. If we use log schooling changes, we also find negative point estimates.
20 We are grateful to Kjetil Storesletten for pointing this out to us.
29We draw four main lessons from this investigation of the role of capital. First, the change
in capital has an enormous effect in a GDP growth equation, probably because of a mechanical
relationship between the errors in measuring capital and GDP or because of reverse causality.
Second, the impact of both the level and change in schooling on economic growth is sensitive to
whether the change in capital is included in the growth equation and allowed to have a
coefficient that greatly exceeds capital's share.Third, controlling for capital exacerbates
measurement error problems in schooling. Instrumental variables estimates designed to correct
for measurement error in schooling yield such a large standard error on the change in schooling
that the results are consistent with schooling changes having no effect on growth or a large effect
on growth; in other words, these results are uninformative. Fourth, when the coefficient on
capital growth is constrained to equal a plausible value, changes in years of schooling are
positively related to economic growth. Unless measurement error problems in schooling and
capital can be overcome, we do not think the cross-country growth equations that control for
capital growth will be very informative insofar as the benefit of education is concerned.
In all, we think the results in this section fairly consistently point to an association
between GDP growth and contemporaneous education changes, once measurement error in
education is taken into account. Although this relationship could come about for spurious
reasons (e.g., fast growing countries could choose to spend more of their resources on education),
the growth equations do not reject a "traditional role" for human capital.
3. Robustness of the Effect of Initial Level of Education on Growth
[lJt is not possible to draw a simple straight line relating secondary education
to economic growth.
W. Arthur Lewis, 1964
30The macro growth equations impose the restriction that allcountries have the same
relationship between growth and initial education, andthat the relationship is linear. The first
assumption is particularly worrisome because the microevidence clearly indicates that the return
to schooling varies considerably across countries,and even across regions within countries. For
example, institutional factors that compress the wage structurein some countries result in lower
returns to schooling in those countries (see, e.g., the essaysin Freeman and Katz, 1995). If the
private return to education varies across countries,externalities from the stock of education may
vary as well. Thus, we first allowthe effect of the level of education on growth to vary by
country. Next, we examine the effect of relaxingthe linearity assumption and controlling for
additional variables. Both of these extensions to the standard growth specificationsuggest that
the constrained specification estimated in the literature shouldbe viewed with caution.
3.1 Heterogeneous Country Education Effects
The specifications previously estimated in the empirical growthliterature constrain the
initial level of education to have the same effect in each country.A more general model would
allow the initial level of education to have a different effectin different countries. Since there is
more than one observation per country inthe 5- and 10-year growth models, this easily can be
accomplished by interacting a set of dummy variables indicatingeach country with the base year
education level for those countries. The average ofthe country-specific-education slopes
provides an informative measure of the effectof initial education on growth for the average
country. It is instructive to note thatthe coefficient on initial education estimated fromthe
restricted, single-coefficient OLS model can be decomposed as aweighted average of the more
general country-specific slopes, where the weights arethe country-specific contributions to the
overall variance in schooling.2' This result is importantbecause it indicates that the source of
21This results requires that there are no other covariates; see KruegerandLindahi,1998. If country fixed effects are
included in the model, the OLS constant coefficient can still be decomposed asa weighted average of the country-
specific coefficients even if there are other covariates.But we exclude country fixed effects so that these estimates
are comparable to the earlier ones, and because includingfixed effects would exacerbate measurement error bias.
31variation in the single-coefficient regression and averageof the variable coefficients model is the
same, but the country-specific slopes areaggregated differently in the two estimates.
Of course, if the assumptions of the constant-coefficientmodel hold (and the other Gauss-
Markov assumptions hold), the OLS weights arethe most efficient weights. But if a variable-
coefficient model is more appropriate, there is no a priori reasonto prefer the OLS weights over
other weights. Indeed, it is rather odd to weightthe country-specific slopes by the OLS weights
if the slopes differ across countries. The unweighted-averagecoefficient is probably a more
relevant summary statistic because it representsthe expected value of the education coefficient
for a random country in the world.
In Krueger and Lindahl (1998; Table 6) weestimated variable-coefficient models using
5-year and 10-year changes in GDP; wesummarize the results here. First, consider resultsof
relaxing the homogenouseduCatiOflc0effiC1t
assumption in the models in colunm 1 and5 of
Table 4. The constant education slope assumptionis overwhelmingly rejected by the data for
each time period (p-value <0.0001). Indeed, the R2 of the equations morethan doubles when the
education slopes are unconstrained. Of more consequence,the average slope coefficient on the
initial level of education is negative, though notstatistically significant, in the variable-
coefficient models (see Krueger and Lindahi, 1998,Table 6). These results cast doubt on the
interpretation of initial education in theconstrained macro growth equation common inthe
literature.
We also estimated variable-coefficient models usingthe average years of secondary and
higher schooling for males insteadof the average years of all education for theadult population.
This variable has been emphasized as a keydeterminant of economic growth in Barroswork.
Again, however, the results of theconstant-coefficient model are qualitatively differentthan
those of the variable-coefficient model. Indeed,for the average country in the sample, a greater
We would also point out that the average of the country-specificcoefficients is still informative when there are
covariates, even if the single coefficient estimate cannot be decomposed as a simple weighted averageof the
country-specific coefficients.
32initial level of secondary and higher education has a statistically significant, negative association
with economic growth over the ensuing 10 years.22
3.2 Exploring the Linearity Assumption and Additional Explanatory Variables
It is common in the empirical growth literature to assume that initial education has a
linear effect on subsequent GDP growth. Although Mincer (1974) provides conditions under
which education has a linear relationship with log earnings, these conditions do not necessarily
imply that the level of initial education has a linear relationship with income growth. To
examine the linearity assumption, we included initial education and its square in the 10-year
change model in column 4 of Table 4. These results are reported in the first column of Table 6.
The data seem to prefer the quadratic specification, as the squared education term is statistically
significant. More importantly, the relationship is inverted-U shaped, with a peak at 7.5 years of
education. Since the mean education level for OECD countries in 1990 was 8.4 years in Barro
and Lee's data, the average OECD country is on the downward-sloping segment of the education-
growth profile. If we also include the square of log GDP per capita, the initial level of education
continues to have a nonlinear effect that peaks below the average education level of OECD
countries; see column 2. We also find an inverted-U shaped relationship between education and
GDP growth that peaks below the level of education of developed countries when we examine 5-
and 20-year changes in GDP.
The results in columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 indicate that the effect of the initial level of
education is sensitive to including other covariates in the model. These models hold constant
several additional explanatory variables that are often controlled for in the literature, including
the log of the fertility rate, log life expectancy, and investment and government spending as
22CasselIi, Esquivel and Lefort (1996, Table 4) also find that the coefficient on male secondary and higher education
has a negative effect on growth when they use a generalized method of moments model to estimate a first-
differenced specification of the growth equation. It should be noted that our random coefficient approach uses the
same cross-section variation in education to identif' the coefficient on education as our OLS results in Table 4.
33shares of GDP.23 Although one could questionwhether these variables are appropriate
exogenous regressors to includein a growth equation, it is clear that the significanceof the initial
level of education in either the linear and quadratic specificationis greatly diminished when
these variables are controlled for. Indeed, theinitial level of schooling becomes statistically
insignificant if just the log of the fertility rateis included in the equation. Average years of
secondary and higher schooling solely for menhas a more robust association with economic
growth than the broader education measureused in Table 6 if it is included in the growth
equation instead of the average schoolinglevel of the entire population. But, as we discussed
previously, we believe there are strong reasonsfor preferring the broader measure of education.
3.3 Estimates for OECD Countries
In view of the sensitivity of the effect of theinitial education level on economic growth to
the econometric assumptions investigated above,it is worth exploring whether the results hold
for the sample of OECD countries. Table 7 presentsestimates of the effect of initial education
on growth for the subset of OECDcountries, measuring GDP growth over 5, 10 or20 year
periods. In each case, the initiallevel of education had a statistically insignificantand small
effect on economic growth. We similarlyfind that the initial level of secondary and higher
education for men has a statistically insignificanteffect if it is included in the growth equation
for OECD countries instead of the broader schoolingmeasure. These results are not surprisingin
light of the earlier finding that the averageOECD country is on the downward-sloping segment
of the education-growth curve estimated inTable 6.
Together, the results in this section castdoubt on the likelihood that there are large
growth externalities from the initiallevel of education. The pattern of resultsin the less
restrictive (i.e., nonlinear and variable coefficient)specifications, and models with more
extensive covariates, cast doubt on the viewthat the initial level of education exerts a strong
23Thesedata were derived from http://www.nber.Org/PUbThafb
34influence on growth, especially in high educationcountries. Most notably, the initial level of
education appears to be unrelated tosubsequent growth in OECD countries even in the
parsimonious model.
4. Conclusion and Policy Implications
And the preservation of the means of knowledge,among the lowest ranks, is of
more importance to the public, than all the property of the richmen in the
country. It is even of more consequence to the rich themselves, and to
their posterity.
John Q.Adams,1765
The micro and macro literatures both emphasize the roleof education for raising income,
and income growth. An accumulation of researchusing individual-level education and income
data since the beginning of the 20thcentury provides robust evidence of a substantial payoff to
investment in education, especially for those whotraditionally complete low levels of schooling.
From the micro evidence, it is unclear whether the socialreturn to schooling exceeds the private
return, although available U.S. evidence suggests that positive externalitiesin the form of
reduced crime and reduced welfare participationare more likely to be reaped from investments in
disadvantaged than advantaged groups. The macroeconomic evidence ofexternalities in terms of
technological progress from investments in higher educationseems to us to be more fragile.
Externalities from the initial stock of human capitalappear particularly unlikely to apply to
OECD countries.
Our findings help resolve an importantinconsistency between the micro and macro
literatures on education: Contrary to Benhabib andSpiegel's (1994) and Barro and Sala-i-
Martin's (1995) conclusions, the cross-country regressions indicatethat the change in education
is positively associated with economic growthonce measurement error in education is accounted
for. Griliches (1997) conjectured that the "jarring"finding of no relationship between education
changes and GDP growth was due to either measurement error in educationor a tendency for
35more highly educated workers to enter sectors ofthe economy whose contribution to GDPare
systematically under measured. Measurementerror in education appears sufficient toaccount for
the insignificant effect of educationchanges. Indeed, after adjusting formeasurement error, the
change in average years of schooling often hasa greater effect in thecross-country regressions
than in the within-country micro
regressions. Controlling for capital growth reduces theeffect of
education changes, but the magnitude of theeffect in the cross-country data is stillat least as
great as the micro return to education oncemeasurement error is taken into account.
The large return to schoolingchanges found in the cross-country modelssuggests that
reverse causality or omitted variables createproblems at the country level of analysis,or that
increases in average educational attainmentgenerate nationwide externalities. Although the
microeconometrjc evidence in several countriessuggests that within countries the causal effect of
education on earnings can be estimatedreasonably well by taking education asexogenous, it
does not follow thatcross-country differences in education can be taken as acause of income as
opposed to a result of current income or
anticipated income growth. Moreover, countries that
improve their educational systems are likely toconcurrently change other policies that enhance
growth, producing a different source of omitted-variablebias in cross-country analyses.
Education, in the eloquent description of Harbison andMyers (1965), "is both the seed and the
flower of economic development." It is difficultto separate the causal effect of education from
the positive income demand for education incross-country data. For this reason, Mankiw (1997)
describes the presumed exogeneity of schoolenrollment as the "weak link" in theempirical
growth literature. In our opinion, this link isunlikely to be strengthened unless thecross-country
literature can identify natural experiments inschooling attainment similar to those that have been
exploited in the microeconometrjc literature, and unlessmeasurement errors in the cross-country
data are explicitly taken into account in theeconometric modelling.
For policy makers, the obviousprescription to enhance growth is that, on the margin,
funds should be invested in thecomponents of the education system that generate the highest
36social returns. But the micro andmacro evidence suggest that the returns toinvesting in different
educational levels are likely to differacross countries, depending on thecountry's state of
development, distribution of income, andstructure of the education system. Thereare unlikely
to be universal answers. In the UnitedStates, there is much support for the view thatinvestments
in young, disadvantaged children havethe highest returns, and that it isvery difficult to improve
the economic circumstances of adolescenthigh school dropouts with short-termjob training
(e.g., Heckman, 1998). This viewimplicitly underlies the recent increasedsupport for Head
Start and smaller primary schoolclasses, and the shift in JTPA fundsaway from job training for
out-of-school youth. But the circumstances inthe U.S. may be unique.
Optimal education policy for Swedenmay be quite different than for the U.S. Heckman
(1998) argues that investment invery young children in America pays a high return because
"early learning begets later learning." In theU.S., 22 percent of children underage 6 live in
families that fall below thepoverty line, and an incredible 59 percent of children under6 who
live with single mothers are inpoverty (U.S. Census Bureau, 1998). High rates of childhood
poverty, coupled with a patchwork system of childcarearrangements, may lead to particularly
high payoffs to investments inyoung children in the U.S. Moreover, the lagging development of
many American children, and high existing subsidies tocolleges (see Winston and Yen, 1995),
may reduce the return on investments at olderages. Sweden has a much more equal distribution
of income, and a more extensive anduniversal system of childcare. Asa consequence, Sweden
may be in a situation where investments in education for older
students pay a higher return than
investments in programs forvery young children. But one must also be concerned that the U.S.
evidence vis-à-vis agemay reflect the fact that there are critical stages ofdevelopment during
childhood that condition the payoff to investmentsat various ages, and that these stages inlarge
part determine the payoff to investing in certainage groups irrespective of economic and social
circumstances.
37Another overriding factor in Sweden involves thecompression of the wage structure,
which depresses the private return to acquiring skillscompared to the U.S. and most countries of
the world. Edin and Holmiund (1995) and Fredriksson(1997) find that college enrollment in
Sweden is quite responsive to the privatepayoff to education prevailing at the time students
make their enrollment decisions.Although Sweden has a high level ofpost-secondary
educational attainment by world standards, it is nonethelesslikely that the level of educational
attainment is distorted by the depressedprivate payoff to education and skills.This
consideration may militate in favor of a policy ofincreasing education at higher levels in
Sweden. How this is best accomplished is unclear, however.The current thrust of subsidizing
dislocated workers to return to school has benefits andcosts. For example, older workers will
enter the workforce more quickly than,say, pre-school children, so the gestation period for
investments in older workers' human capital is much shorter.On the other hand, the U.S.
experience has been one of rather ordinary returns to investments ineducation for dislocated
workers. Moreover, in Sweden some observersare concerned that subsidizing unemployed
workers to return to school may create a disincentive in whichsome workers intentionally delay
completing their education, find ajob only to become unemployed, and thenspend a long period
in school while collecting unemployment insurance benefits.
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Figure 1: Unrestricted Schooling-Log Wage Relationship and Mincer Earnings






















YearsofSchoolingFigure 2: Average Years of Schooling in Sweden,








Notes: Barro-Lee data are for population age 15 and older; 1980 and 1991 survey data are
from Swedish Level of Living Survey (LNU), and 1984 survey data are from Household
Market and Nonmarket Survey (HUS). Both LNU and HUS pertain to population age 18-75.Table 1: OLS and IV Estimates of the Return to Education with Instruments Based on Natural Experiments
Sample,
OLS IV (p-value)
Study Strategy, and Instruments
1920-29 cohort in 1970 1. Angrist and 1970 and 1980 Census Data. Men. 0.070
(0.000)
0.101
(0.033) Krueger (1991) Instruments are quarter of birth
interacted with year of birth.
1930-39 cohort in 1980 0.063 0.060 Controls include quadratic in age
(0.000) (0.030) and indicators for race, marital
status, urban residence.
cohort in 1980 0.052 0.078
(0.000)(0.030)





(0.033) Rouse (1993) Instruments are tuition at 2 and 4-
year state colleges and distance to
nearest college. Controls include
race, part-time status, experience,
Schooling measured in units of
college credit equivalents.
or parental






3. Card (1995a) NLS Young Men (1966 Cohort)
Instrument is an indicator for a
nearby 4-year college in 1966, or
the interaction of this var. with
parental education. Controls
include race, experience (treated
as education), region, and parental
Models that use college
proximity as instrument
(1976 earnings)
















(0.024) Uusitalo (1997) army in 1982, and were working
full time in civilian jobs in 1994.
Administrative earnings and
education data. Instrument is
dummy for living in university
town in 1980. Controls include
quadratic in experience and










5. Maluccio (1997)Bicol Multipurpose Survey (rural
Philippines). Male and female
wage earners age 20-44 in 1994,
whose families were interviewed in
1978. Instruments are distance to
nearest high school and indicator
for local private high school.
Controls include quadratic in age
and indicators for gender and
residence in a rural community.
Models that do not














6. Harmon and British Family Expenditure Survey 0.061
(0.001)
0.153
(0.015) Walker (1995) 1978-86. Men. Instruments are
indicators for changes in the
minimum school leaving age in
1947 and 1973. Controls include


















1986. Men. Instrument is indicator
for cohort born 1930-35 and/or
whether father served in World
War II. Controls include a
quadratic in age, unemployment
rate at age 14 and indicators for
fathers education, socioeconomic
status and self-employed status.
Returns were calculated based on
assumption of 4 years of high
school.
1995 Intercensal Survey of
Indonesia. Men born between
1950-72. Instruments are interactions
between indicators for age in 1974
and some measure of the program
intensity in region born, capturing
the effect of a large scale governmental
primary school program. Controls
include indicators for year and region
of birth and indicators for year of birth,
interacted with no. of children and with
enrollment rate in 1971.
Models that use cohort
1930-35 as instrument
Models that use father in
World War II as
instiiiment
Models that use cohort
1930-35 and father in
World War II as
instruments
Model that uses number of
schools per child built in
1973-78 as a measure of
program intensity.
Sample Identification













born after 1946. Instrument is 1930-35 as instrument.
11
indicator for cohort born 1930-35.
(0.004) (0.086)
Controls include age and
unemployment rate at age 14.
8. Lemieux and 1971 and 1981 Canadian Census. 1971 Canadian Census.
Card (1998) 1973 Job Mobility survey. Men,
World War II veterans from
Quebec (French speaking) and
Ontario (English speaking).
Instruments are potential eligibility
for World War II educational
assistance program or an
interaction between this and
fathers education. Controls
include quadratic in potential
experience and dummy for Quebec
(row 1 and 2) or quadratic in
actual experience, dummy for
Quebec, served in World War II
and fathers education (row 3).




























9. Butcher and U.S. PSID. White women age 24-Models that 0.091
Case (1994) 65 in 1985. Instruments are
indicators for the presence of
sisters, or sisters indicator and
quadratic in number of siblings.
Controls include a cubic in age,
indicators for Catholic, oldest
child, poor household and parental
education,
indicator for presence of
sister as instrument
Models that use
indicator for presence of
sister and quadratic in

















1991 Swedish Level of Living
Survey. 427 men born between
1945-55. Instrument is an indicator
of whether the individual was born
in a municipality which implemented
a compulsory schooling increase for
that cohort. Controls include father's
education, cohort and region dummies.
Model that uses compulsory 0.028
schooling differences across (0.007)
areas and cohorts to
identi the return to
schooling.
Notes: Rows 1-6 are adapted from Card (1998); rows 7-10 are authors' summaries.The estimates and standard errors in row
7 are divided by 4 to approximate the yearly returns to schooling. Hausmantests of the equality of OLSandIV estimates are
based on authors' calculations; test in row 10 is only approximate because themodels are not identical.
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0.036 0.72
(0.021)Table 2: Replication and Extension of Benhabib andSpiegel (1994)





























































R2 .694 .720 .291 .688 .726 .271
Notes: All change variables were divided by 20, including the dependent variable.Sample size
is 78 countries. Standard errors are in parentheses. All equations also includean intercept.
S65 is Kyriacou's measure of schooling in 1965; A Log S is the change in log schooling
between 1965 and 1985, divided by 20; and Y65 is GDPper capita in 1965. Mean of
dependent variable is .039; standard deviation of dependent variable is .020.
49Table 3. Reliability of Various Measuresof Years of Schooling
Estimated Reliability Ratios for Barro-Lee andKyriacou Data
Reliability of Reliability of
Barro-Lee DataKyriacou Data
Average yeass of .851 .964
Schooling, 1965 (.049) (.055)
Average years of .773 .966
Schooling, 1985 (.055) (.069)
Change in years of .577 .195
Schooling, 1965-85 (.199) (.067)
Notes: The estimated reliability ratiosare the slope coefficients from a bivariate regression
of one measure of schooling on the other. Forexample, the .851 entry in the first row is the
slope coefficient from a regression in which thedependent variable is Kyriacou's schooling
variable and the independent variable is Barro-Lee's.Sample size is 68 countries. Standard






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 5: The Effect of Schooling and Capitalon Economic Growth
Dependent Variable: Annualized Change in Log GDPper Capita, 1965-85
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AS .066 .017 .015 .083 .069
(.039) (.032) (.042) (.043) (.167)
S6 .004 .0013 .0005 .002 -.001
(.001) (.0008) (.0010) (.001) (.002)
LogY65 -.009 -.026
(.003) (.003)
A Log Capital .598 .795 .648 35* .597
per Worker (.062) (.058) (.073) (.119)
Log Capital per .016 .002 -.002 .001
Worker 1960 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.004)
R2 .63 .76 .58 .12 .55
Sample Size 92 92 92 92 66
Notes: Change variables have been divided by the number ofyears spanned by the
change (20 years for schooling and log GDP, 25 years for capital).Schooling data
used in the regressions are from Barro and Lee. The instrumentalvariables model in
column 6 uses Kyriacous schooling data as excluded instruments forthe level and
change in Barro-Le&s schooling variables. Capital data are from Kienow and
Rodriguez-Glare (1997), and pertain to 1960-85.
*The coefficient on the change in log capital in column 4 isconstrained to equal .35,
which is roughly capitalTs share.
52Table 6: Analysis of Inipact ofControlling for Additional Explanatory Variables and Quadratic Specificationon the Initial Schooling Effect
DependentVariable: Annualized 10-Year Change inLog GDP per Capita
Explanatory (1) (2) (3) (4) Variable
Initial Schooling .oio .010 .002 .000
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.001)
Initial Schooling Squared—.0007 -.0007 —.0002
(.0002) (.0002) (.0001)
Initial Log GDP —.005 —.005 .030 .035
(.003) (.022) (.025) (.025)
Initial Log GDP Squared .003 -.303 —.338 (Divided by 100) (.146) (.163) (.162)
Log Fertility Rate —.025 —.025
(.005) (.005)





Democracy Index .001 .002
(.002) (.002)
Democracy Index Squared -.076 —.083 (/10,000)
(.039) (.038)
Investment Relative to GDP .0008 .0008
(.0002) (.0002)
Government Consumption -.080 -.080 Relative to GDP
(.031) (.031)
Inflation Rate —.026 —.026
(.005) (.004)
.284 .284 .527 .526
Peak of Schooling 7.46 7.57 5.80 Quadratic
P—value for F—test of .000 .000 .582
schooling terms
Notes: Sample size is 292 for all columns.Observations with missing values of some variables were assigned themean value for
those variables. Schooling and GDPper capita are initial values (i.e., values at the beginning of the10-year period.) The inflation rate is measured from thebeginning to the end of the
10-year period. The terms of trade variable isthe growth rate over each period of the ratio of export toimport prices. All other variables are averages over the10—year periods.Table 7: The Effect of Schoolingon Economic
Growth in the OECD
Dependent Variable: Annualized Change in
Log GDP per Capita, Various Time Periods
5-year10-year 20-year
Growth Growth Growth
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Initial Schooling -.000 -.000 .000
(.001) (.001) (.001)
InitialLogGDP -.015 -.015 -.011
(.008) (.006) (.005)
R2 .43 .55 .35
Sample Size 138 69 23
Notes: The dependent variable has been divided by the
number of years spanned by the change. Columns 1
and 2 also includes time dummies.
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